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Abstract. An authenticated encryption scheme allows messages to be encrypted
and authenticated simultaneously. In 2003, Ma and Chen proposed such a scheme
with public verifiability. That is, in their scheme the receiver can efficiently prove
to a third party that a message is indeed originated from a specific sender. In this
paper, we first identify two security weaknesses in the Ma-Chen authenticated en-
cryption scheme. Then, based on the Schnorr signature, we proposed an efficient
and secure improved scheme such that all the desired security requirements are
satisfied.
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1 Introduction
In the areas of computer communications and electronic transactions, one of im-
portant topic is how to send data in a confidential and authenticated way. Usu-
ally, the confidentiality of delivered data is provided by encryption algorithms,
and the authentication of messages is guaranteed by digital signatures. In the
traditional paradigm, these two cryptographic operations are performed in the
order of encrypt-then-sign. In [2], Horster et al. proposed an efficient scheme such
that messages can be encrypted and authenticated simultaneously. Later, Lee and
Chang [3] improved Horster et al.’s authenticated encryption scheme so that no
hash function is needed. However, both schemes does not provide the property of
not-repudiation, i.e., the receiver cannot prove to a third party that some messages
are indeed originated from a specific sender. In [8], Zheng introduced signcryp-
tion schemes such that unforgeablility, confidentiality, and not-repudiation can be
provided simultaneously. Since the non-repudiation protocols in [9] are based on
zero-knowledge proofs, Zheng’s schemes are inefficient when there are disputes
between the receiver and the sender.
In [4], Ma and Chen proposed an efficient authenticated encryption scheme
with public verifiability. That is, in their scheme the receiver Bob can efficiently
prove to a third party that a message is indeed originated from the sender Alice.
However, this paper shows that their scheme is insecure since dishonest Bob can
forge a valid ciphertext so that it looks as if it were generated by Alice. In our at-
tack, the only assumption is that Bob registers his public key with a certification
authority (CA) after he knows Alice’s public key. This assumption almost always
holds in the existing public key infrastructures (PKIs). Another problem in their
scheme is that their public verification protocol does not work due to a mathe-
matical error. To overcome these weaknesses in the Ma-Chen scheme, we propose
a new scheme based on the Schnorr signature. In addition, technical discussions
are provided to show that our scheme is secure and efficient.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first reviews the Ma-
Chen scheme. Then, the security analysis is presented in Section 3. After that, we
propose a new scheme and analyze it in Section 4. Finally, the conclusion is given
in Section 5.
2 Review of the Ma-Chen Scheme
A third trusted party (TTP) selects a triple (p, q, g), where p and q are two large
primes satisfying q|(p − 1), and g ∈ Z∗p is an element of order q. It is assumed
that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem are difficult in the cyclic group
Gq = 〈g〉. That is, given g, g
a, gb, gc ∈ Gq where a, b and c are unknown random
numbers, it is infeasible to determine whether gab mod p equals gc mod p 1. In
addition, the TTP publishes a secure hash function H(·). We assume that Alice
and Bob have the certified secret/public key pairs (xA, yA = g
xA mod p) and
(xB , yB = g
xB mod p), respectively.
To send a messagem ∈ Z∗p to the receiver Bob, the sender Alice does as follows.
(A-1) Pick a random number k ∈ Z∗q, and then compute v = (g · yB)
k mod p,
e = v mod q.
(A-2) Set c = m ·H(v)−1 mod p, r = H(e,H(m)), and s = k − xA · r mod q.
(A-3) Send the triple (c, r, s) to Bob via a public channel.
Upon receiving (c, r, s) from Alice, the receiver Bob does the following:
(B-1) Compute v = (g · yB)
s · y
r(xB+1)
A mod p and e = v mod q.
(B-2) Recover the messagem = c·H(v) mod p, and check whether r ≡ H(e,H(m)).
(B-3) If r ≡ H(e,H(m)) holds, Bob concludes that (c, r, s) is indeed encrypted
by Alice.
For public verification, Bob first computes K1 = (y
s
B · y
r·xB
A mod p) mod q,
and then forwards (H(m),K1, r, s) to the arbitrator TTP. The TTP performs as
follows:
1 There are another two related numerical assumptions, i.e., the discrete logarithm (DL) problem
and the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem are difficult in the cyclic group Gq = 〈g〉.
That is, given g, ga, gb ∈ Gq where a and b are unknown random numbers, it is infeasible to
compute a or gab mod p. Actually, it is easy to know that DDH assumption is at least as strong
as CDH assumption, and CDH assumption is at least as strong as DL assumption.
(TTP-1) Compute e′ = (gs · yrA ·K1 mod p) mod q.
(TTP-2) If r ≡ H(e′,H(m)), the TTP knows that Alice is the originator of
encryption and signature.
3 Security Analysis of the Ma-Chen Scheme
We now give some explanations and remarks on the Ma-Chen scheme. Note that
to decrypt and verify the triple (c, r, s), one needs to know the value of xB or yAB,
where yAB = g
xA·xB mod p. Actually, using yAB the ciphertext (c, r, s) can be
easily decrypted and verified as follows: (a) compute v = (g ·yB)
s ·yrAB ·y
r
A mod p,
and e = v mod q; (b) recover m = c · H(v) mod p, and check whether r ≡
H(e,H(m)). Therefore, the value of yAB can not be revealed to anybody other
than Alice and Bob. The authors of [4] noticed this problem. Therefore, in their
scheme only the tuple (H(m),K1, r, s) (not including the value of v) is revealed
to the TTP, so that even the TTP cannot derive the value of yAB. The reason is
that if one value of v is known by the TTP (or anybody else), then yAB can be
obtained easily by yAB = y
−1
A · v
r−1 · (g · yB)
−s·r−1 mod p. In addition, recall that
anybody cannot derive the value of yAB directly from Alice’s public key yA and
Bob’s public key yB, since it has been assumed that the DDH assumption holds
in the multiplicative cyclic subgroup Gq = 〈g〉.
Based on the above observations and the fact that the value of s in the Ma-
Chen scheme is computed in a very similar way as in the secure Schnorr signature
scheme [6], the authors of [4] analyzed the security of their scheme, and claimed
that their scheme satisfies the following security properties:
(1) Unforgeability: Except Alice, any attacker (including Bob) cannot generate a
valid ciphertext (c, r, s) for a messagem so that the verification procedure (B-1
to B-3) or the the public verification procedure (TTP-1 to TTP-2) is satisfied.
(2) Confidentiality: Under the DDH assumption, any third party cannot derive
the message m from the ciphertext (c, r, s).
(3) Non-repudiation: Once Bob reveals (H(m),K1, r, s), anybody can verify that
(r, s) is Alice’s signature. Therefore, the TTP can settle possible disputes be-
tween Alice and Bob.
However, in the following we show that their scheme is forgeable actually.
Moreover, we identify an design error in their public verification procedure. That
is, even all parties follow the specifications of their scheme honestly, the TTP
cannot conclude that (H(m),K1, r, s) is generated by Alice. Therefore, the Ma-
Chen scheme does not meet the properties of unforgeability, non-repudiation and
public verifiability.
Forgeability. Firstly, the authors observed that Bob is the strongest attacker
to forge a triple (c, r, s), since he knows xB which is used in verification procedure.
Then, they claimed that their scheme is equivalent to the Schnorr signature [6].
So they concluded that their scheme is unforgeable against adaptive attacks, as
the Schnorr signature is proved to be unforgeable (in the random oracle model)
[5]. Unfortunately, we notice that this is not the fact, though the value of s is
indeed calculated in a very similar way as in the Schnorr signature [6]. To show
this fact directly, we now demonstrate a concrete attack on the Ma-Chen scheme.
In our attack, we assume that Bob registers his public key yB with a certification
authority (CA) after he knows Alice’s public key yA. This assumption almost
always holds in the existing public key infrastructures (PKIs). Anyway, in the
original paper [4], it is not specified that Alice and Bob have to register their
public simultaneously. Moreover, in many scenarios it seems worth to register or
update a (new) public key in the point view of the (malicious) verifier Bob, even
if such an action can only enable him to forge one valid ciphertex for one message.
To amount this attack, the verifier Bob forges a valid ciphertext (c, r, s) for a
message m of his choice as follows.
(1) Pick two random numbers a, b ∈ Z∗q, and compute v = g
a · ybA mod p.
(2) Compute e = v mod q, c = m · H(v)−1 mod p, r = H(e,H(m)), and s =
rab−1 mod q.
(3) Set his secret key xB = br
−1 − 1 mod q, and then register the public key
yB = g
xB mod p with a certification authority (CA).
We now show that the forged triple (c, r, s) is a valid ciphertext for message m
with respect to the public keys yA and yB. Firstly, the following equalities hold:
(g · yB)
s · y
r(xB+1)
A mod p ≡ g
(1+xB)s · ybA mod p
≡ ga · ybA mod p
≡ v.
Then, we have e ≡ v mod q, m ≡ c ·H(v) mod q, and r ≡ H(e,H(m)). So (c, r, s)
is a valid triple.
In addition, note that even if Alice realizes later a triple (c, r, s) was forged via
the above attacking procedure, she cannot defence for herself by computing Bob’s
secret xB . We explain the reasons as follows. Since the hash functionH(·) is usually
modelled as a random function, to derive the secret key xB the useful information
for Alice is the following three equations: v = ga · ybA mod p, s = rab
−1 mod q,
and xB = br
−1−1 mod q. Firstly, note that Alice (with her secret key xA) cannot
derive the values of a and b from equation v = ga · ybA mod p, as there are q − 1
candidates of such pairs (a, b). More specifically, for any given a ∈ Z∗q , there is a
fixed value of b such that v = ga · ybA mod p. Secondly, Alice can try to derive the
value of xB by eliminating a and b in the above three equations. To do so, she
knows that a = s(1 + xB) mod q and b = r(1 + xB) mod q. Consequently, Alice
gets equation v = (gs ·yrA)
(1+xB) mod p. To get the value of xB from this equation,
Alice has to face the difficult discrete logarithm problem, which is widely believed
intractable.
Design Error. We note that the TTP cannot validate a valid tuple (H(m),K1, r, s)
by the public verification procedure, i.e., TTP-1 to TTP-2. The reason is that
e′ 6= e even if Alice, Bob, and the TTP all are honest. Namely,
[(g · yB)
s · y
r(xB+1)
A mod p] mod q 6= [g
s · yrA ·K1 mod p] mod q,
where K1 = (y
s
B · y
r·xB
A mod p) mod q, p and q are two primes such that q|(p− 1).
In the original paper [4], however, the those two expressions are considered as
equivalent. This problem is also identified independently by Wen et al. [7]. For
more details, please refer to their paper.
4 Improved Scheme
In this section, we propose an improvement of the Ma-Chen scheme by exploiting
the similar idea of Bao and Deng [1]. However, different from Bao and Deng’s
work, we use the provably secure Schnorr signature as the underlying signature
scheme. Furthermore, technical discussions are provided to show that our scheme
is secure and efficient.
4.1 Description of the Scheme
In our scheme, we assume that (EK(·),DK(·)) is a pair of ideal symmetric key
encryption/decryption algorithms under the session key K. In addition, h(·) is
another suitable hash function, which maps a number of Zp to a session key for
our symmetric key encryption/decryption algorithms. Other notations are the
same as in Section II.
To send a message m ∈ Z∗p to the receiver Bob in an authenticated and en-
crypted way, the sender Alice does as follows.
(A-1) Pick a random number k ∈ Z∗q, and then compute t1 = g
k mod p, and
t2 = y
k
B mod p.
(A-2) Set c = Eh(t2)(m), r = H(m, t1), and s = k + r · xA mod q.
(A-3) Send the triple (c, r, s) to Bob via a public channel.
Upon receiving (c, r, s) from Alice, the receiver Bob does the followings:
(B-1) Compute t1 = g
sy−rA mod p, and t2 = t
xB
1 mod p.
(B-2) Recovers the message m = Dh(t2)(c), and check whether r ≡ H(m, t1).
(B-3) If r ≡ H(m, t1) holds, Bob concludes that (c, r, s) is indeed encrypted by
Alice.
For public verification, Bob just needs to release (m, r, s). Then, any verifier
can check whether (r, s) is a standard Schnorr signature for message m as follows:
(V-1) Compute t1 = g
sy−rA mod p.
(V-2) (r, s) is Bob’s valid signature for message m if and only if r ≡ H(m, t1).
4.2 Security
Our scheme is very simple in the logic structure. That is, we exactly use the
Schnorr signature scheme to generate the pair (r, s), i.e., the standard Schnorr sig-
nature for a message m. Therefore, according the provable security of the Schnorr
signature given in [5], any adaptive attacker (including Bob) cannot forge a valid
ciphertext (c, r, s) for any message m such that m = Dh(t2)(c) and r ≡ H(m, t1),
where t1 = g
sy−rA mod p, t2 = t
xB
1 mod p. Otherwise, this implies that the attacker
has successfully forged a valid Schnorr signature (r, s) for a message m, which is
in turn contrary to the provable security of the Schnorr signature scheme. So our
scheme satisfied the unforgeability.
Now we discuss the confidentiality, i.e., except the receiver Bob, anyone else
cannot extract the plaintext m from the ciphertext (c, r, s). Firstly, note that an
attacker cannot extract the plaintext m from the equality r ≡ H(m, t1) after
recovering t1 = g
sy−rA mod p, since the secure hash function H(m, t1) hides the
information of m. Another way for getting the message m is to decrypt the ci-
phertext c directly. To do so, the attacker has to obtain the session key h(t2)
since (EK(·),DK(·)) is assumed to be an ideal (so secure) symmetric key encryp-
tion/decryption algorithm pair. This means that to get the session key h(t2), the
attacker has to get the value of t2 first, since h(·) is also a secure hash function.
However, the attacker cannot get the value of t2 from the values t1 and yB. In
fact, the latter problem is the CDH problem, which is widely believed intractable
in security community. Therefore, we conclude that our scheme meets the the
confidentiality.
Finally, the property of non-repudiation is also satisfied in our scheme due to
the following two facts: (a) Only Alice can generate a valid ciphertext (c, r, s); and
(b) Anybody can very that (r, s) is a standard Schnorr signature if the receiver
Bob releases the triple (m, r, s). Consequently, a TTP can easily settle potential
disputes between Alice and Bob by checking whether r ≡ H(m, t1), where t1 is
computed by t1 = g
sy−rA mod p.
4.3 Efficiency
In our scheme and the Ma-Chen scheme, the length of ciphertext (c, r, s) is the
same, i.e., |p| + 2|q| bits. For a real system, p and q can be selected as primes
with lengths of 1024-bit and 160-bit, respectively. In this setting, the length of
ciphertext (c, r, s) is 1344 bits.
We now discuss the computation overhead. We only count the numbers of
exponentiations that are performed by each party, due to the fact that the expo-
nentiation is the most time-costing computation operation in most cryptosystems.
In the Ma-Chen scheme, to generate and verify a ciphertext 3 exponentiations are
needed (by Alice and Bob). In our scheme, this number is 5, increased a little.
However, to convert a ciphertext (c, r, s) into public verification, Bob does not
need to perform any exponentiation in our scheme, while in the Ma-Chen scheme
2 exponentiations are required. In addition, it is the same that the TTP needs to
do 2 exponentiations in the public verification procedures of both schemes. In one
words, these two schemes have no much difference in the performance.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we identified two security weaknesses in the Ma-Chen authenti-
cated encryption scheme proposed in [4]. Our results showed that their scheme is
insecure. Moreover, based on the Schnorr signature scheme, we proposed a new
scheme such that all desired security requirements are satisfied.
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